In this paper we discuss the interest of applying differential co-payment rates across alternative medical treatments. Two treatment strategies are considered: a "long term strategy" in which patients apply preventive measures before knowing if they have the desease and an "emergency strategy" where patients are treated on contraction of the disease. We show that the second approach should be more generously subsidized by the regulator.
In countries which rely mainly upon public funds to finance health care, identical co-payment rates are often applied to a variety of medical activities to restrain public spending. For instance, the co-payment rate for visits to specialists (in ophtalmology, cardiology, internal medicine and so on) may be uniformly raised from e.g. 20 to 30 per-cent in the hope of containing the increase in health expenditures for the social security system. While obvious administrative reasons may justify uniform co-payment rates (or uniform increases in them), the purpose of this paper is to show that there are also good economic reasons for differentiating co-payment rates according to the nature of the medical activity (as is the case in other fields of government interventions).
To illustrate our point of view we consider a group of patients who face the risk of suffering from a single disease during a given period. The idiosyncratic probability that each patient will get the disease is known, at least to him while the distribution of these probabilities in the population is public knowledge. To fight the disease two mutually exclusive 1 medical strategies are available :
− either patients are regularly treated from the very beginning of the period. We refer to this strategy as "long term treatment" (L.T.T.) ; − or nothing is done pro-actively and patients are treated "in emergency" when a medical accident reveals during the period that they have the disease. This is the "emergency strategy" (E.S.).
Our objective in this paper is to show that in accordance with well known results in public finance (see e.g. Atkinson A.B. and J. Stiglitz (1980) ), it is appropriate to differentiate the copayment rate of the treatments (i.e. one minus the public subsidy rate granted according to the medical strategy). We show besides that the emergency treatment should be more generously subsidized than the L.T.T.
To reach this objective, the paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we present the model and its notation. Section 2 is devoted to individual choices that are influenced both by the medical conditions and the co-payment rates applied to each medical strategy as well as the level of taxes needed to finance the subsidies.
In section 3 we compare the first best solution of the problem to a "laissez-faire" one. Section 4 is devoted to a "second-best" approach. It is in this section that we prove our main result about the optimal co-payment rates. We end up with a short conclusion and perspectives for future research.
SECTION 1 : THE MODEL
We consider a population of patients with identical additive utility functions ( )
where is an increasing and concave function in final wealth and H is the final health state. These patients are also endowed with the same initial wealth. The only difference between them is the probability ( of developing a given disease during the period.
( )
At the beginning of the period, nobody knows who will become sick : only the probability that each patient becomes sick during the period is known, at least to him. The distribution of the probabilities of disease is public knowledge and it is represented by a density function with cumulative distribution
If someone becomes sick without receiving treatment his health state is denoted while full health (absence of disease and of treatment) implies of course a higher level of H, denoted with . In summary the lottery faced by a patient who does not get any treatment is represented by :
where W-T is initial wealth (W) net of taxes (T).
If at the beginning of the period the patient chooses the long term treatment (L.T.T.) he modifies the lottery he faces. While σ is unchanged by this strategy, the net financial and medical outcomes are modified. The net cost of the strategy for the patient is (1-s)C where C is the cost of L.T.T. and where (1-s) is the co-payment rate (so that s is the subsidy rate determined by the regulator). As far as its medical efficiency is concerned the long term treatment improves the health state of sick people by b (with 0 2 H b H + < ) and it does not deteriorate the health state of patients who do not become sick.
The other available medical strategy corresponds to emergency medicine (E.T.). When it is adopted no treatment is initiated at the beginning of the period but if the disease occurs during the period, an emergency treatment is used. Its net cost to the patient is where is the co-payment rate applied to this treatment and C % is the cost of E.T.. As is natural we assume that C C ≥ % and that the emergency treatment is medically less efficient than the ( ) 
We assume that this condition is always satisfied even when , i.e. under "laissez-faire".
The choice between the two treatments may now be represented by a decision-tree :
Before looking at individual choices it is worth pointing out that the E.T. strategy is not dominated by the L.T.T. one despite the fact that it is medically less efficient ( ) b b < % and more costly (
. Indeed the emergency treatment has an "informational" advantage :
since it is applied ex-post when the true state of the world is revealed it is given only to sick people. On the contrary, the long-term treatment is used as well for sick people as for healthy ones. As a result its lower cost per patient
> % is compensated for by the fact that is applied to a larger population.
SECTION 2 : INDIVIDUAL CHOICES
At the beginning of the period a patient who is informed only about the probability ( that he will develop the disease must decide to adopt or not the long-term treatment. Of course the higher the more attractive to him the long-term treatment. In fact there exists a probability threshold such that the patient is indifferent between the two alternatives described in the decision tree. Formally is solution of :
Patients for whom exceed turn to the long term treatment while others "wait" and use the emergency treatment later on in case of need.
σσ
It is easy to determine how is influenced by the decisions of the regulator about the variables he controls (s, and T). Implicit differentiation of (2.1) yields :
In accordance with intuition (2.2) and (2.3) indicate that if a treatment is more generously subsidized it will be more often adopted by patients. For instance if emergency medicine is better subsidized, increases so that more patients decide not to use the long-term treatment. Among these patients some of them will become sick and will need the emergency treatment.
σ
The impact of T on is sign ambiguous essentially because the wealth effect is itself signambigous. σ 5
SECTION 3 : THE "FIRST-BEST" AND "LAISSEZ-FAIRE" SOLUTIONS
Before turning to the optimal selection of s, and T by the regulator in the next section, we first compare a "first-best" solution to a "laissez-faire" one.
s % If the regulator adopts a "laissez-faire" (L.F.) approach, he implicitly chooses s s and simply observes individual choices. In contrast, in a first-best solution (F.B.) the regulator observes σ and thus can determine some threshold for T 0 = = = % σ above which patients are forced to take -free of charge -the long-term treatment. Below the threshold patients are denied L.T.T. and are refered to the emergency treatment -again free of charge -in case of need 2 . The program is financed by a uniform lump-sum tax T levied on all patients at the beginning of the period.
These two programs are analyzed in turn and are then compared for a specific case.
3.a. The "laissez-faire" solution (L.F.)
In this case, the choice of individual patients is determined as in eq.(2.1) with T s s . Hence the threshold probability at which patients are indifferent between each possible decision is solution of :
The left hand side (L.H.S). of (3.1) represents the expected utility of final wealth gained by adopting the E.T. rather than the L.T.T. strategy. The right hand side (R.H.S.) of (3.1) is the expected loss of health state if E.T. is used instead of L.T.T. Of course at the threshold probability the expected gain is equal to the expected loss. 
where is the risk premium associated with the following lottery : π 2 Of course we exclude by assumption the case where no treatment at all would be efficient.
Because the R.H.S. (right hand side) of (3.1') is necessarily non negative one has:
a result that will be used later on.
3.b. The first-best solution
In this environment the regulator is assumed to be utilitarian and to know the value of σ for each individual so that he can determine who receives L.T.T. which is offered free of charge. Patients who do not have the L.T.T. and who become sick get the E.T. also free of charge. The program is financed by a lump-sum tax T on each individual in order to cover the treatment costs. Formally one has :
where σ is the average value of . σ
The first-order condition (F.O.C.) associated with this program is :
where is the treatment threshold for the first-best solution. Because it avails upon perfect information, the regulator can directly use this threshold to allocate patients across the two treatments. This condition means that the net welfare cost of a further patient allocated to L.T.T. is at the optimum equal to his expected improvement in health state.
FB σ
The second order condition for a maximum is easily checked and notice again that because the R.H.S. of (3.4) is non negative, one also has a natural upper-bound for σ which is : 
3.c. A specific case
When L.T.T. and E.T. have the same medical benefit ( )
an easy comparison between and emerges. In this case indeed the right hand side of (3.1') becomes equal to zero so that :
while (3.4) yields :
As a result -and contrarily to a widespread belief -more patients adopt the L.T.T. under the laissez-faire solution than under the first-best one. However the reason for the result is easily understood. When b b = % the regulator who adopts the first-best solution is indifferent between the two treatments from a medical point of view and he tries to minimize the T value that permits every sick patient to reach a health level 0
i.e. when the marginal cost of obtaining the benefit b b = % for one sick patient is the same under each strategy 4 . In the "laissez-faire" however, risk averse individual patients -at equal medical benefit -have a propensity to favor L.T.T. because it generates a known cost C as opposed to the random one induced by E.T. Hence they use L.T.T. more often than what would be observed in the first-best solution.
3 Notice that if the patient were very risk averse LF σ might be very close to zero.
4 Indeed, to obtain b b = % for one sick patient with E.T., the marginal cost is . However to obtain C % b b = % for one sick patient with L.T.T. this strategy has to be applied to 1 σ patients inducing a cost equal to Ĉ σ .
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SECTION 4 : THE "SECOND-BEST" APPROACH AND ITS PROPERTIES
In a second best environment, treatment decisions are left to the patient but they are influenced by the regulator through his choice of , s and T s % 5 . The regulator selects these control variables in order to maximize the sum of individual utilities under a global budget restraint. Formally, one has :
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint and where λσ is defined as in (2.1).
Assuming interior solutions the F.O.C. associated to the program are : A similar interpretation applies to (4.1"').
The additional public spending associated with the marginal cost of raising s or is weighted by that stands for the marginal cost of public funds expressed in terms of social welfare. From (4.1') can be written as:
If T had no effect on σ the marginal cost of public funds would simply be equal to [ ] E U' , the expected marginal utility of wealth.
Although they do not lend themselves to an easy comparative statics exercise 6 , these F.O.C. already reveal some important features of the optimal co-payment rates. In fact it can be proven that it is never optimal to equate the co-payment rates and that systematically should exceed s* .
s* %
The proof is made in steps.
(1) When , is negative. This result -which will be very important in step 2 -is easily obtained. Indeed rewrite (2.1) by using the concept of the risk premium, i.e. : Because the right hand side of (4.2) is non negative one has : ( ) ( w the regulator's optimality condition with respect to s and (2) Consider no 4.1" and 4.1"' for any pre-determined T. After obvious manipulations they become : 
